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The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal 
fisheries, community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture. We focus on conflict 
and cooperation in the Caspian Sea – a global commons – involving five claimant countries as 
well as interests of major powers (the United States, European Union, and China). Building on 
the work of Stern and Young on the study of conflict and cooperation in global commons, we 
model the case as a prisoner’s dilemma game with the two different outcomes. In the North 
Caspian Sea, competing claimant countries – Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan – have agreed 
to cooperate and solve their differences over ownership of oil fields. In contrast, claimants in 
the South Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan – have failed to cooperate despite 
decades of trying. Using analytic narratives, we suggest that politics (or strategic calculations) 
could help explain these two different outcomes. In making these calculations, countries will 
act in their rational self-interest, given the prospects of international anarchy. We suggest 
that this realist account can be partly explained by the convergence of economic interests, 
geopolitics, and cultural distance. We argue that the study of global commons would benefit 
from understanding realist theories of international relations.
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1. Introduction
The conventional literature on the commons involves small, local resources such as coastal fisheries, 
community forestry, small-scale irrigation, and community pasture. Scholars have studied more than 
twenty variables associated with the governance of local commons and have provided empirical support 
for Ostrom’s design principles governing the commons (Hinkel et al., 2015). In contrast, the literature on 
global commons is not as extensive as the local commons. Building on Ostrom’s principles, Stern (2011) 
proposed a set of principles for governance of the global commons while Young (2002) argued that regime 
systems that govern global commons are dynamic and evolve over time.
Our paper adds to the works of Stern and Young on the governance of global commons. We build on Stern’s 
design principles by showing – through game-theoretic reasoning – that politics (or strategic calculations 
based on various interests) could explain variations in outcomes of a certain type of global commons, in this 
case, oil and gas resources. We also build on Young’s regime systems theory (i.e., governance regimes matter) 
by showing how the governance regime for the Caspian Sea has evolved over time.
We use the Caspian Sea as a relevant case study for several reasons. First, there are five countries (Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) competing over valuable common pool resources (oil, gas, and 
fishery) and pipelines connecting Asia with Europe. Oil, gas, and fishery are common pool resources because 
they are both rivalrous in consumption, and it is difficult to exclude others from exploiting them (Araral 
et al., 2019). Two of these claimant countries have powerful militaries – Russia and Iran – and have long 
histories of conflict in the Caspian Sea. In addition, China, the European Union, and the U.S. all have vital 
interests at stake in the region, especially with regards to access to oil, shipping lanes, and pipelines.
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With the appearance of the three new claimants around the Caspian Sea in the post-1991 period, the 
littoral states had to redefine their maritime borders. The agreement on the status of the Caspian was 
an acute issue for all coastal states because the implementation of several major oil projects, including 
pipeline infrastructure, was linked to this matter. Since hydrocarbon reserves distributed unevenly along 
the coastal line of the Caspian, it was particularly difficult to find a common solution to the problem. The 
most promising oil and gas reserves were found in Central and Northern parts of the Sea, close to Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.
The controversy evolved over the legal status of the Sea, as this influences how the hydrocarbon, water, 
and fishery resources would be shared. The key question debated by the littoral states is whether Caspian 
is a ‘sea’ or a ‘lake’. The labeling is contested because it determines which international treaty applies in 
regulating the ownership rights over the Sea and its resources.
If the Caspian would be formally defined as a ‘lake’, norms of international customary law apply. From 
the beginning of the dispute, Iran and Russia expressed solidarity in advocating the ‘lake’ classification of 
the Caspian. They argued that prior to Soviet disintegration, it was owned jointly by the riparian countries 
and, such a regime should continue to govern. The two countries further claimed that joint ownership is 
needed in order to protect the local ecosystem from environmental damage, caused by the irresponsible 
development of hydrocarbon resources.
Alternatively, if the Caspian would be given the status of a ‘sea’ the relations between the riparian states 
would be regulated by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to UNCLOS, 
each state can claim the 12-mile territorial sea area as well as 200 miles of the exclusive economic zone. 
Because the width of the Caspian does not exceed 200 miles, its exclusive economic zone will not extend 
beyond the median line. In addition, articles 69 and 124–132 provide that landlocked states can claim 
access to high seas (UNCLOS, 1982). In this situation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan would 
potentially be able to claim access to the Baltic Sea (through the Volga river) and the Black Sea (through 
channel connections).
Second, the Caspian Sea is an interesting case because it illustrates successful and unsuccessful examples 
of cooperation over valuable oil, gas, and fishery resources. Claimants of the North Caspian Sea had managed 
to set aside their differences and cooperate to explore and develop their resources jointly. In contrast, this is 
not the case for the South Caspian neighbors. We identify the similarities and differences between the North 
and the South and explain different outcomes by using a prisoner’s dilemma as our conceptual analysis 
framework.
The case of the Caspian Sea is a prisoner’s dilemma because each country has an incentive not to cooperate 
and become greedy, hoping that they can get more benefits from exploiting the resources. However, 
riparian states would all become worse off if they do not cooperate. First, in terms of environmental impact, 
the lack of cooperation leads to increased pollution due to irresponsible offshore development and oil 
transportation. Second, uncertainty discourages foreign investment as some of the oil deposits are still 
waiting to be developed because two or more parties have reciprocal claims. Finally, disagreement between 
the riparian states leads to worsening bilateral relations, while in the worst-case scenario, escalating tensions 
could lead to military conflict.
Third, in theory, the governance dilemmas of local and global commons are similar – i.e., potential for 
competition and conflict, free riding, congestion, over expropriation, credible commitment issues, monitoring 
and enforcement (Araral, 2013). However, Stern argues that the issue of scale, distribution of powers, and 
ability to learn changes the dynamics of collective action in large-scale, transboundary commons. While we 
recognize these differences, we argue that from a game theoretic standpoint, the structure of dilemmas 
between local and global commons are fundamentally the same. In our paper, we use a stylized prisoner’s 
dilemma to frame the ‘game’ being played by various countries in the Caspian Sea.
Fourth, the sparse literature on the global commons has focused on arctic wildlife, whaling, and outer 
space (Buck, 2017; Young, 2002). Our paper focuses on a salient common pool resource – oil and gas reserves. 
We argue that the salience and strategic importance of the resource matters in the evolution of the global 
commons regime. It matters because countries may go to war over oil and gas resources but not likely in the 
case of biodiversity, whaling, arctic wildlife, global atmosphere, and outer space.
Finally, the conventional literature on the global commons (see Stern, 2011) provides for a set of design 
principles – modified from Ostrom’s (1993) principles – to govern the global commons. Stern’s principles, 
however, do not consider economic interest and geopolitics of the global commons as key variables, although 
he recognizes that the distribution of powers and interests would vary between local and global commons.
In this paper, we make an attempt to explain the two different outcomes in the North and South Caspian 
Sea over the control of oil fields, gas, and pipelines. We suggest that differences in the governance of the 
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commons in the North and the South can be explained by economic interests, geopolitics (security interests) 
and cultural distance (historical and personal ties) between states. In this regard, a review of historical events 
will shed light on factors that influenced government policies.
As to the structure of this paper, the next section provides a review of the relevant literature on the 
issue of commons and the regulation of global commons in international law. In section 3 we present a 
case study of the Caspian Sea with an in-depth historical and analytical account of events in the North 
Caspian Sea, where countries managed to solve the conflict and engage in cooperative relations. The 
following section then compares it with the South Caspian Sea, where countries are still struggling 
to resolve their conflict despite decades of trying. The fifth section compares and contrasts the two 
cases. The final section summarizes the main findings and theoretical implications for the study of the 
global commons.
1.1. Local and Global Commons
Stern (2011) suggests that global and local commons differ in terms of geographic scale, number of users, 
salience (or actor’s awareness of degradation), distribution of interests and power, cultural and institutional 
homogeneity, regeneration of degraded resource, feasibility of learning, ease of understanding resource 
dynamics and stability of resource dynamics (Table 1).
For these reasons, Stern (2011) points to the challenges in applying Ostrom’s design principles to the global 
resource commons. These challenges include: 1) the problem of devising rules congruent with ecological 
conditions; 2) defining boundaries for resources and appropriators; 3) monitoring and enforceability 
of rules; 3) the size of appropriators; 4) the disconnect between users and losers of resource use, and 5) 
circumstances when science may not be credible to stakeholders, among others.
Because of these differences, Araral (2014) suggests that Hardin’s prediction of the tragedy of the commons 
seems justified in the case of large, transboundary commons. Examples include the unabated destruction 
of corals and overfishing in the coral marine triangle in the southeast Pacific Ocean (WWF, 2009) and the 
massive degradation of the marine ecosystem in the South China Sea (Hughes et al., 2013). Araral also points 
to the underground water crises in Northeast China (Xie, 2008), the desiccation of the Aral Sea in Central 
Asia, one of the world’s worst environmental disasters (Micklin & Aladin, 2008; Murzakulova et al., 2019), 
the unabated degradation of forests in Borneo in Indonesia (WWF, 2013) and the unregulated use of the 
global atmosphere and oceans as a global sink.
Table 1: Comparison of local and global commons.
Local natural resources Global commons
1 Geographic scale Local Global
2 Number of resource users Tens to thousands Millions to billions
3 Salience: actors’ awareness 
of degradation
Resource use is conscious 
purpose: resource provides 
major portion of livelihood
Resource degradation is unintended 
byproduct of intentional acts; actions 
causing degradation are of low 
importance for most users
4 Distribution of interests 
and power
Benefits and costs mainly 
internal to group of 
appropriators
Significant externalities between 
appropriators and others across places and 
generations; differences of interest and 
power among classes of appropriators
5 Cultural and institutional 
homogeneity
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
6 Feasibility of learning: Good Limited
6a Regeneration of 
degraded resource
Renewable over less than a 
human generation
Regeneration over more than a 
human generation
6b Ease of understanding resource 
dynamics
Feasible without extensive 
scientific training
Scientifically complex with limited 
predictive ability
6c Stability of resource dynamics Stable, though variable Dynamic systems with changing rules
6d Ability to learn across places Possible Difficult
Source: Stern (2011).
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Likewise, because of these differences, Stern (2011) concludes that the governance of the global commons 
requires a different set of principles from those proposed by Ostrom. Stern suggests the need to invest in 
science to understand the resource and its interactions with users and those affected by its use as well 
as establishing independent monitoring of the resource and its use that is accountable to the range of 
interested and affected parties. He also suggests having more meaningful participation of the parties in 
framing questions for analysis, defining the import of scientific results, and developing rules. Moreover, he 
argues for integrating scientific analysis with broadly based deliberation while engaging and connecting a 
variety of institutional forms from local to global in developing rules, monitoring, sanctioning and planning 
for institutional adaptation and change. Notably, Stern does not put significant emphasis on politics or the 
strategic calculations of nation-states in relation to the global commons.
In contrast, Young (1994, 2002) provides a more nuanced and optimistic view on the governance of global 
commons based on the regime theory. In essence, the theory argues that regime systems that govern global 
commons are dynamic. They evolve over time, some successfully into problem-solving organizations such as 
the case of the Arctic commons, the Third Law of the Sea Convention, the deep seabed, whaling, and marine 
pollution regimes, Antarctica and outer space regimes for weapons. In addition, there is also a handful of 
what can be considered as relatively successful governance of large-scale, national and regional commons: 
China’s Yellow River Basin (Giordano, 2004); Colorado River Basin, the Murray Darling Basin in Australia 
(MDBA, 2013), and cooperation in the Arctic (Young, 1994). Strictly speaking, however, these are not open 
access commons in the sense that property rights to these resources are relatively well defined and exclusion 
to the resource system and resource unit is feasible.
1.2. International Law and the Global Commons
The literature on international law offers some insights involving conflicts in international waters. The 
main governance mechanism is UNCLOS, which aims (as summarized in its preamble) to create ‘a legal 
order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans’ (UNCLOS, 1982).
Beckman et al. (2013) argued that UNCLOS could provide a framework for the joint development of 
hydrocarbon resources in territories with overlapping claims. In particular, UNCLOS provides two principles 
for joint development that avoids the contentious issue of sovereignty and boundary delimitation. First, it 
encourages claimant countries to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature in territories 
with overlapping claims without prejudice to the final delimitation. The need for provisional arrangements 
is in recognition of the fact that delimitation negotiations could be time-consuming. Second, UNCLOS 
encourages claimant countries to observe mutual restraint during the transitional period, which should 
not hamper reaching a final agreement on delimitation. These two principles help claimant countries to 
manage their otherwise contentious relations. As more countries resolve their differences in this manner, 
other claimant countries build up the confidence and use this as a norm that joint development is possible 
without a threat to their sovereignty.
In addition to UNCLOS legal framework, Beckman et al. (2013) identified several factors conducive to 
joint oil development based on lessons from at least ten cases of conflicting claims in the resource-rich 
South China Sea. These factors make it possible to set aside differences and resolve conflicts with or without 
the Convention. In the case of the Caspian Sea, the conflicts were, in fact, resolved without reference 
to the UNCLOS as a legal framework. UNCLOS is not a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for the joint 
development of oil resources as the case of the Caspian Sea would suggest.
The first and foremost factor is the economic reason – the pressing need for energy security and the 
need for oil revenues. Economic interests are the primary drivers that led to at least ten joint development 
projects in contested maritime territories in the South China Sea. This is clearly the case for the 1974 
Japan-South Korea arrangement; the 1979 Malaysia-Thailand Agreement; the 1989 Australia – Indonesia 
Arrangement; the 2002 Australia-Timor Leste arrangement; 1992 Malaysia-Vietnam arrangement; the 2009 
Malaysia-Brunei arrangement, among others.
Another factor is the relationship and degree of trust among the political leaders of the claimant countries. 
We argue that this is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Beckman et al. (2013) point to the examples 
of Prime Minister of Thailand and Malaysia in their 1979 MOU; between Brunei and Malaysia, among 
others. Trust building among political leaders has been made possible through their numerous face-to-face 
encounters during regular meetings of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN made 
it possible for countries to trust one another even without the benefit of the UNCLOS. For Ostrom (2003), 
trust is at the core of a set of variables that could explain variations in the outcomes of the commons.
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The next factor is the presence of uncertainty. In some cases, claimant countries suspect that there are 
significant energy resources within an overlapping claim, but their precise location and amount is unknown. 
This can motivate them to set their differences aside and enter into joint exploration arrangements. In this 
paper, we examine whether the two different outcomes in the North and South Caspian Sea could be partly 
explained by factors identified by Beckman et al. (2013).
2. The Case of the Caspian Sea
In this paper, we examine the conflict over oilfields in the Caspian Sea – a water body between Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (Figure 1). For more than two centuries until 1991, only two states formally 
possessed the resources of the Caspian – the Soviet Union (Russia) and Iran. With the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, the number of riparian states increased from two to five: Azerbaijan in the 
south-west, Iran in the south, Kazakhstan in the northeast, Russia in the north-west and Turkmenistan 
in the south-east.
As the newly independent former Soviet Union states began reinvigorating their economies by inviting 
foreign direct investment, the 1990s saw a revival of oil production in the Caspian Sea. This transformed the 
region into one of the most strategically important places in the world not just because of oil but because it 
is located between Europe and Asia, offering the littoral states access to naval and pipeline routes. The vast 
oil reserves and the strategic value of the Caspian Sea became a source of conflict among the five claimant 
states. We examine how the states in the North have managed to cooperate among themselves while those 
in the South have failed to do so despite years of trying.
Two camps emerged from the beginning of the dispute – proponents of the ‘lake’ status (joint ownership) 
and proponents of the ‘sea’ status (sectoral division). By the end of 1997, Russia and Iran found their interests 
converging, whereas Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan maintained the position that the Caspian 
should be divided into national sectors. As the parties refused to make concessions, the littoral states 
found themselves in a deadlock. The joint ownership approach would threaten the political and economic 
Figure 1: Caspian Sea with oil and gas deposits and claimant countries.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.
php?RegionTopicID=CSR.
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independence of the former Soviet states. The local actors realized that no move could be made forward with 
developing the Caspian hydrocarbon resources if there will be no compromise on the issue.
2.1. The Caspian Sea as a prisoner’s dilemma
The dispute in the Caspian Sea can be analyzed using a prisoner’s dilemma analogy (Table 2). As originally 
formulated:
‘Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confine-
ment with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to 
convict the pair on the principal charge. They hope to get both sentenced to a year in prison on a 
lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given 
the opportunity either to: betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to 
cooperate with the other by remaining silent. The offer is: 1) If A and B each betray the other, each 
of them serves two years in prison; 2) If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will 
serve three years in prison (and vice versa); and 3) If A and B both remain silent, both of them will 
only serve one year in prison (on the lesser charge) (Poundstone, 1992)’.
In a Prisoner’s dilemma game, players are locked into a situation in which the best outcome for everyone 
is to cooperate (each serves only one year of jail time) but individually their dominant strategy is not to 
cooperate (no jail time). If the parties choose not to cooperate because that is in their self-interest, the 
result will be that both will be worse off (each serves two years in jail).
We recognize that there are certain strong assumptions behind the Prisoner’s Dilemma model, namely: 
1) that this is a one-off game; 2) that players cannot communicate, and 3) they cannot make credible 
or binding commitments. While the prisoner’s dilemma analogy is a highly stylized simplification of 
an otherwise complicated situation, it does capture the strategic choices that claimant countries in the 
Caspian Sea are facing. An important point to make, though is that the Caspian Sea situation is not a 
single-shot game and that players can, and have been communicating with each other over time, but the 
outcomes have been different.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysis, the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma can be extended to the 
Caspian Sea. Each claimant country, thinking its own interest, may cooperate with other claimant hoping 
that they can get more benefits from exploiting resources from the Caspian Sea. This is what initially 
happened when no country was willing to compromise on their positions.
However, the riparian states would all become worse off if they do not cooperate. First, in terms of 
environmental impact, the lack of cooperation leads to increased pollution due to irresponsible offshore 
development and oil transportation. Environmental activists claimed that the population of rare sturgeon 
has declined by 90% since the 1970s (ICTD, 2003). Media often reports about seals found dead along the 
coast of the Caspian due to the increasing pollution. Pollution problems in the Caspian regularly raised by 
environmentalists, but little can be done in the absence of delimitation agreement.
Next, disagreement between the riparian states leads to worsening bilateral relations and lack of 
regional (economic and political) cooperation. In the worst-case scenario, escalating tensions can lead 
to military conflict. By the end of the 1990s, the militarization of the Caspian had become an apparent 
trend. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Sea, the littoral states considerably strengthened their 
naval forces.
Finally, uncertainty discourages foreign investment, and as a result, claimants are unable to reap the 
benefits of oil exploration. Indeed, some of the oil deposits in the South Caspian are still waiting to be 
developed because two or more parties have reciprocal claims. These fields include Alov (Alborz) and Kyapaz 
(Serdar) located between Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan. If the Caspian dispute would be resolved, the 
littoral states will be able to exploit the full potential of their natural resources, attracting more investment 
Table 2: Prisoner’s dilemma.
Prisoner B (cooperating) Prisoner B (not cooperating)
Prisoner A (cooperating) Each will serve one year Prisoner A: serves 3 years in prison
Prisoner B: released
Prisoner A
(not cooperating)
Prisoner A: released
Prisoner B: serves 3 years in prison
Each will serve 2 years 
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and constructing new export pipelines. As the region has the potential to become one of the largest energy 
suppliers in the world, the agreement on the legal status of the Caspian would improve the investment 
climate and political stability.
In the next sections, we employ analytic narratives to explain why and how the North Caspian Sea states 
have managed to change their situation from one of conflict to one of cooperation while the South Caspian 
Sea states are not yet able to. Analytic narratives use game theoretical analysis (in this case Prisoner’s Dilemma) 
along with historical accounts (narratives) (Bates et al., 2000). This methodology has the advantage enabling 
to explain outcomes based on a rational choice account of historical events (Levi, 1997). Furthermore, this 
approach examines the situation from the perspective of a calculating actor and makes decisions taking into 
account their costs and benefits.
2.2. Successful Cooperation in the North Caspian
It is not surprising that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan opposed the idea of joint ownership and advocated 
the sectoral division of the Sea since the two countries have the biggest proportion of the oil reserves of 
the Caspian. Furthermore, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were genuinely interested in the speedy resolution 
of the issue. First, they were eager to entrench their sovereignty over their territorial possessions and 
natural resources in the Caspian Sea. Secondly, they desperately needed foreign investment to rebuild their 
devastated economies.
Unwilling to share its oil wealth, Azerbaijan rejected the proposal of the condominium approach. Baku 
appealed to the fact that in the 1970s, the USSR Ministry of Petroleum formally divided the ‘Soviet part’ of 
the Caspian, assigning exclusive sectors for each littoral Soviet republic. Kazakhstan’s position was similar to 
Azerbaijan’s in supporting a ‘sea’ status of the Caspian. Since Kazakhstan’s share of the Sea contains about 
two-thirds of the region’s energy reserves, the country actively supported the idea of dividing the Caspian 
into national sectors.
Beginning from early years of independence, the two northern neighbors actively engaged in oil 
operations attempting to de facto demarcate the Sea. In December 1993, Kazakhstan signed a contract 
with multinational companies to conduct exploration works in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian. Seven 
companies joined the Kazakhstankaspiyshelf joint venture, including AGIP, BG, BP-Statoil, Mobil, Shell, and 
Total. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan concluded $8 billion contract with foreign investors to develop its biggest 
Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli deposits in 1994. This agreement, notoriously known as the ‘contract of the century’ 
formed the AIOC joint venture with the key partners represented by Azeri national oil company SOCAR and 
British company BP.
Although Russian oil company Lukoil was also a member of the AIOC, Russian foreign ministry expressed 
an open discontent with Azerbaijan’s unilateral decision to commence oil operation in the Caspian. As BP was 
amongst the major investors, Russia sent a demarche to the British Embassy in Moscow in 1994 stating that:
‘By its very nature the Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single eco-system and 
represent an object of joint use, within those boundaries all issues of activities, including resource 
development, have to be resolved with the participation of all Caspian countries. Taking the above 
into account, any steps by whichever Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with 
regard to the areas and resources of the Caspian Sea run counter to the interests of other Caspian 
states and cannot be recognised … [and] … any unilateral actions are devoid of legal basis’ (cited in 
Brzezinski & Sullivan, 1997: 139).
Russia asserted that the condominium regime established in the Caspian between the Soviet Union and 
Iran prevails in the absence of the new agreement. Moscow insisted that the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 
1940 is still valid because Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are signatories to Alma-Ata 
declaration, which provided that the parties recognize the validity of all treaties signed by the Soviet 
Union. Based on this, Russia asserted that until the new agreement is reached, the littoral states should 
not act without mutual consultation.
By the end of the 1990s, the claimant states in the North Caspian had realized that the move must be 
made towards finding a solution. Kazakhstan started bilateral negotiations with its nearest neighbors 
on the delimitation of maritime borders in the Sea. During the visit of Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov 
to Almaty in February 1997 the two countries signed a joint declaration, which stipulated that ‘until 
there is an agreement with the states of the Caspian region on the status of the Sea the parties will 
adhere to the demarcation of administrative and territorial boundaries along a middle line’ (Nazarbayev, 
2008: 109).
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The dynamics of the dispute changed after Russia altered its position from demanding joint ownership to 
agreeing to demarcate the seabed. The long-standing dispute between Russia and Kazakhstan on oilfields 
in the Caspian was eventually resolved when President Boris Yeltsin and President Nazarbayev met in April 
1998. This meeting proved to be a turning point for cooperation in Northern Caspian and ushered in 
cooperative projects between Russia and Kazakhstan. The parties agreed to jointly develop (on a 50/50 
basis) Kurmangazy, Khvalynskoe, and Tsentralnoe deposits in Central and Northern Caspian (Kommersant, 
1998). Following the new arrangements, Lukoil and Kazakhoil companies continued together operations in 
the North Caspian.
Consequently, Russia and Kazakhstan signed the landmark Agreement ‘On delineation of the bottom 
of the northern part of the Caspian Sea with respect to the sovereign rights to subsoil use’ on July 6th, 
1998. The document entrenched the principle of sharing the northern part of the Caspian Sea along the 
median line, which runs at the same distance from the opposite shores. While the agreement provided 
grounds for delimitation of the seabed, the surface remained under the joint control. On the same day as the 
bilateral agreement on Caspian maritime borders was signed between Russia and Kazakhstan, the countries 
signed a treaty ‘On eternal friendship and alliance, oriented for the XXI century’. Finally, in May 2002, the 
governments of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a protocol setting geographical coordinates of the median 
line between the two countries.
Azerbaijan, on the other hand initially rejected Russia’s proposition to sign a similar bilateral agreement. 
Baku demanded full delimitation, with the division of not only the seabed but also water surface. Following 
the protracted negotiations, Russia and Azerbaijan finally signed an agreement on the delimitation in 
January 2001. President Putin and President Aliyev met in Baku and announced that the two states reached 
the consensus on delimitation using ‘a stage by stage approach’. The first phase included demarcation and 
division of the Caspian seabed by drawing a median line.
Likewise, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the delimitation of the Caspian seabed in 
November 2001. Two years later the two countries signed a protocol establishing geographical coordinates 
of the median line. The countries also agreed on utilization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline for 
exports of Kazakh oil to global markets. The agreement was mutually beneficial for both countries as 
Azerbaijan expected rents from transit fees from oil exports, while for Kazakhstan, the BTC pipeline offered 
access to the Western energy markets.
By the beginning of the second post-Soviet decade, there have been signs of intensification of bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations, which indicated the mutual willingness of states to settle the issue. Subsequently, 
the Caspian states held several meetings: Russian-Turkmenistan meeting (January 2002), Azerbaijan-Iran 
negotiations (March 2002) and the summit of all five countries in Ashkhabad (April 2002). During the 
Second Caspian Summit in Tehran (2007) and the Third Caspian Summit in Baku (2010), the states signed 
several agreements mainly concerning questions of security cooperation and stability in the region.
The abovementioned bilateral agreements changed the layout of the confronting powers in the Caspian 
region. In the period between 1991–1998, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan insisted on a sectoral 
division of the Sea, while Russia and Iran found themselves in the camp supporting the shared ownership 
of the resources. However, the post-1998 events led to the formation of the two different blocks: the 
Northerners comprising the states who had formally agreed on the demarcation of the seabed namely 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia and the Southerners, i.e. the states that have not formally agreed on 
delimitation of the Sea (Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan).
2.3. The Difficulty of Cooperation in the South Caspian
In contrast to the successful resolution of conflict among the North Caspian States, claimant states in the 
Southern part – Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan – have failed to agree. There are several reasons for 
this. First, there was an international law issue of how to decide ownership of the sea among the three 
claimant states. Iran insisted that until a unanimous agreement has been reached, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty 
should be the basis for deciding the ownership of the sea. Tehran favored the ‘condominium approach’ 
stating that all resources in the Caspian should be developed jointly. Iran was unhappy with the ‘sea’ 
definition of the Caspian as the 12-mile coastal zone would not offer possibilities for oil extraction. They 
also opposed the idea of dividing the Caspian into national sectors – something they claimed did not exist 
during the Soviet period.
Turkmenistan’s position initially was similar to the Iranian stance, although later the differences prevailed. 
Ashgabat proposed that each state should have its coastal fishing zone, whereas the area beyond this zone 
should be used jointly by all littoral states. During the First Caspian Summit in 2001, Turkmenistan insisted 
on moratorium for oil exploration until coastal states agree on demarcation. Azerbaijan was Turkmenistan’s 
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main opponent in debates as both countries claim Azeri and Chirag (known as Khazar and Osman in 
Turkmenistan) oilfields in Southern part of the Caspian (see ACG in Figure 1). Turkmenistan argued that 
these deposits lie beyond the median line closer to the Turkmen border. The country’s appeal to the UN in 
1997 to settle the dispute was not successful.
The Azeri-Turkmen relations worsened as the tension heated over the ownership of Kyapaz/Sardar 
Jangal oilfield (Figure 1). Turkmenistan attempted to call for tender to develop the area but suspended 
works soon since no company agreed to enter the consortium. Azeri SOCAR and Russian Lukoil started 
exploration works in the area in 1997. Following the notes of protest from the Turkmen side, Russia 
withdrew from the consortium. Turkmenistan continued to claim that Azeri and part of Chirag oilfields 
are being developed illegally by Azerbaijani consortium. However, the latter continued oilfield exploration 
works. The confrontation had led to worsening of diplomatic relations, and in 2001 Turkmenistan closed 
its embassy in Baku.
Azerbaijan found itself in arguably the most difficult situation because it had disputed territories with the 
both of the southern neighbors. Iran rejected the proposal to jointly develop Araz/Alov/Sharg fields also 
located in the South Caspian Sea. Similarly, Azerbaijan was not able to make progress in bilateral negotiations 
with Turkmenistan as none of the parties was willing to make concessions. The two countries were close to 
resolving a dispute in 1998, as they announced the agreement to divide the Caspian along the median line 
but they disagreed on where exactly the central line should lie.
Witnessing that the littoral states started to develop the hydrocarbon deposits in the Caspian, Iran in 
1998 signed a contract with Royal Dutch/Shell and LASMO to develop Alborz deposit (named Alov in 
Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan immediately reacted by sending protest notes and claiming that the exploration 
works commenced in the Azeri part of the Caspian. Following this, Azerbaijan signed an agreement with BP 
in 1998 to conduct exploration works in the same area. In 2001, the tension escalated as the Iranian armed 
vessel forced Azerbaijani oil exploration platforms operated by BP-Amoco away from the disputed area (Lee, 
2005). Subsequently, Iran sent military aircraft into the disputed areas and territories close to the Azeri coast.
With the escalation of the conflict, the geopolitical actors reacted immediately as Turkey, and the U.S. 
announced their support for Azerbaijan. Turkey sent its air forces to the Azeri border, whereas Washington 
offered financial assistance. Russia also criticized Iran’s actions during the Caspian summit in July 2001 
(Granmayeh, 2004). Eventually, the conflict was prevented from further escalation with Azerbaijan terminating 
oil operations, while BP announced the suspension of activities in the area of overlapping claims.
The upsurge in oil prices by the end of 1990-s meant that the littoral states defended their individual 
interests more fiercely, which led to rising tensions between the neighbors. Furthermore, external players 
started to play a more active and visible role in the region. Conflicts and the threat of military actions 
affected the level of political stability in the region as well as plans to build the new pipeline routes through 
the Caspian Sea. Conflicting geopolitical interests and lack of economic cooperation, therefore, made 
cooperation in the South Caspian Sea almost impossible.
3. Analysis and Discussion
In the following sections, we speculate on various factors that had led to a cooperative solution among 
the North Caspian States and a non-cooperative outcome in the South. We look at factors such as security 
and economic interests, historical ties (Fukuyama, 1989; Owen, 1994), geopolitics and geography 
(Brzezinski, 1997; Kissinger, 1994) and personal chemistry among leaders (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Nye 
Jr, 2008). These factors are relatively well known in the literature on international relations but not in 
the commons literature.
We grouped the factors into three general categories, namely economic interests, geopolitics (security 
interests), and cultural distance (historical and personal ties). These are the variables of interest to governance 
regime scholars (see (Mitchell, 2013) for a review of the literature). It might be the case that there are other 
factors at play, but these are reasonable starting points for our analysis. Table 3 summarizes the mechanisms 
driving these factors and our stylized assessment of the relative effects of these factors to explain successful 
cooperation in the North Caspian but not in the South Caspian (as of July 2018). We discuss these factors in 
the sections that follow.
3.1. Cooperation among the North Caspian States
After years of competition and major disagreements, claimant countries in the North Caspian Sea by the 
late 1990s have entered into various kinds of cooperative arrangements, especially joint oil exploration. 
Here we explore the factors that led them to cooperate with each other – economic interest, geopolitics 
(security interests), and cultural distanse (historical and personal ties).
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The trigger for a cooperative solution to the North Caspian Sea started with the compromise agreement 
between Kazakhstan and Russia to jointly develop the projects through a 50:50 joint venture (section 4.1). 
This agreement was crucial as it eventually paved the way for a deal with Azerbaijan and many other bilateral 
deals between Russia and Kazakhstan.
The compromise agreement made sense from the point of view of Kazakhstan’s national interest. First, 
without Russia’s agreement, the country could not fully realize the benefits of oil exploration as its crude 
export pipelines at that time traversed Russian territory. Second, Kazakhstan badly needed the revenues 
from the oil and gas after suffering from severe economic depression in the mid-1990s. Third, Kazakhstan is 
faced with a security dilemma, being located between Russia and China. As a new republic (born in 1991), 
and given the uncertainties in Russia and China in the 1990s, Kazakhstan needed some security guarantees 
from its giant neighbors.
Russia had earlier rejected Kazakhstan’s draft of the Caspian Convention and stuck to their own position 
in the hopes of getting a bigger share of the revenue. However, Russia’s energy sector companies lobbied 
politicians intensely. Most importantly, in the mid-1990s, the Russian economy was reeling from a great 
depression and running out of dollar reserves to import its needs. Russia needed hard currency and it made 
economic sense for it to agree to Kazakhstan’s compromise.
With the support of the home government, Lukoil joined several oil projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
For example, in Azerbaijan Lukoil purchased 10% stake in the major the AIOC consortium (developing Azeri, 
Chirag and Guneshli oilfields) and 10% in the Shah Deniz project. In Kazakhstan, Lukoil entered Tengiz (5%) 
and Karachaganak (13.5%) mega projects. In the Caspian Sea Lukoil is a joint operator with Kazakhstan’s 
companies in several projects such as Severnyi and Tsentralnoe in northern and central parts of the Caspian 
Sea. The company is a shareholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which is Kazakhstan’s main 
export route to the world markets. The alignment of Lukoil’s interests in Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
had a strong effect on these countries agreeing to cooperate with each other.
Table 3: Stylized comparison of factors affecting cooperation and non-cooperation in the Caspian Sea.
Cooperation 
determinants
North Caspian states 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan)
(successful cooperation)
South Caspian states (Iran, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan) (non-cooperation as of July 2018)
Economic 
interest
All three states suffered from severe 
depression in the mid-1990s; both badly 
needed hard currency; this motivated them 
to strike a compromise.
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were motivated to 
secure a deal with Russia as all their oil export 
pipelines traversed through Russian territory.
All northern states needed political stability 
in the region to attract investments and 
reinvigorate their economies. 
Sanctions against Iran prevented the 
neighboring countries to trade with each other 
and engage in joint investment projects.
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan could not secure 
investment for building oil export pipelines 
via Iran.
Iran and Turkmenistan were generally known to 
be hostile towards foreign direct investment.
Geopolitics 
(security 
interest)
Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are 
landlocked countries that heavily rely on 
Russia in terms of trade, oil exports, and 
regional security.
For Azerbaijan, the ongoing conflict with 
Armenia meant that the country attempted 
to build alliances with Caspian neighbors to 
maintain their support.
Iran was alienated in the international arena and 
became an isolated player in the region.
In foreign policy, Turkmenistan upholds ‘positive 
neutrality’ position, according to which the 
country does not participate in any regional or 
global security organizations.
Cultural 
distance 
(historical and 
personal ties)
All three northern states are Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) republics as well as members 
of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).
Well-established trade links between the 
North Caspian states.
State leaders are former Communist 
party members
Iran is not an FSU country, nor is it a member of 
CIS, while Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are FSU 
states and members of CIS.
No established trade links between South 
Caspian states.
Rivalrous and non-cooperative relations between 
leaders of states.
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In international relations, geopolitics is a well-studied determinant of conflict or cooperation (Brzezinski, 
1997; Kissinger, 1994; Mahan, 1914). Geographic proximity – sharing the land and maritime borders – ties 
countries together in terms of trade, culture, and geopolitics. When the economies of neighboring countries 
are closely linked together, their economic interests are aligned such that their dominant incentive is to 
cooperate. This does not mean though that there are no conflicts (there could be many because of proximity 
such as border issues, migration, transboundary issues) but both countries have incentives to cooperate.
We see this kind of dynamics in the North Caspian – between Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan – 
which are bound by multiple ties, including shared history and cultural connections. Both Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan share a land border with Russia as well as the maritime boundary in the Caspian Sea. This made 
it difficult for the newly independent Caspian states to disengage fully from the influence of their northern 
neighbor, Russia.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained the main trade partner for former Soviet republics 
including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Trade relations between the North Caspian triangle remained strong 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1994 Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev proposed an idea of 
establishing Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) to facilitate economic integration in the region. The initiative 
was supported by Russia although it took another two decades until the EEU was formally established in 
2014 with founding members including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
Historical ties among countries help to promote cooperation through social networks among leaders. 
This mechanism is similar to the network mechanism discussed by Humphreys (2005). The elites of former 
colonies are often educated in top universities of colonial countries and speak the language of colonizers. 
It is through these ties – historical and cultural – that these networks of trust are built which makes 
communication, trust and eventually cooperation possible. This is the case that we see in the relations 
between Russia, and its former satellite states Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, which all share 
common ties during the Soviet Union.
Finally, scholars of international relations suggested that good working relations among leaders are 
important, though not sufficient condition, to the resolution of disputes (Hermann & Hagan, 1998; 
Nye Jr, 2008). Good working relations among leaders increase the likelihood of repeated face to face 
communication and negotiation to sort out contentious issues. They may not be able to solve problems 
immediately, but if they continue to communicate over time, there is a higher likelihood of finding a 
solution. In game theory, this is well known as iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (Wu & Axelrod, 1995) in 
which iteration of the game increases the likelihood of cooperation in dilemma situations. In the commons 
literature, repeated face to face communication is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cooperation 
in solving collective action problems.
We see such dynamics in the case of Kazakhstan, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Both Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev 
and Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev were former leaders of the USSR Communist Party and served as 
heads of their respective regional governments prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Just after few 
months after the collapse of the Soviet Union President Yeltsin and President Nazarbayev met in Moscow in 
May 1992 to sign a Treaty ‘On friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance’. This was followed by several 
more high-level meetings that culminated in a resolution of the Caspian Sea dispute.
The meeting of Yeltsin and Nazarbayev in January 1998 was fruitfully concluded by the joint statement 
in which the governments of the two states were commissioned to draft an agreement on the status of the 
Caspian Sea. The result of the consequent governmental negotiations was the signing (on July 6, 1998) of 
an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan ‘On the delineation of the bottom of the northern part of the 
Caspian Sea with respect to sovereign rights to subsoil use’.
After the signing ceremony, President Nazarbayev remarked that: ‘…oil gives either wealth or blood’ 
(Informburo, 2015) and emphasized that the signed documents provide for mutual assistance of the 
parties in case of external military aggression. He also noted that the existing oil in the Caspian can be 
extracted only by solving the issue of political stability in the region. The document opened prospects for 
closer Kazakh-Russian interactions, but also enabled participation of foreign investors in exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources of the Sea. Importantly, it also introduced a precedent for other riparian 
countries to follow the case by signing bilateral agreements on demarcation.
In summary, the impasse in the North Caspian Sea was resolved when Kazakhstan and Russia agreed to 
divide maritime borders as well as to share joint oil exploration and production contracts. For Kazakhstan, 
it made sense to offer a fair and acceptable deal to Russia so that it can realize the gains from high oil 
prices at a time when the country sorely needed finances following the economic depression in the 1990s. 
Kazakhstan’s interests aligned with the interest of Russia’s business groups, especially in the powerful oil 
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and gas industries. Without a cooperative agreement with Kazakhstan, they would not reap the benefits 
from the Caspian resources. With the alignment of economic interests, the prospects for cooperation was 
facilitated by the geopolitical environment, historical ties as well as good working relations between the 
leaders of former Soviet Union republics.
3.2. Failure of cooperation in the South Caspian Sea
The conflict in the South Caspian Sea features similar determinants of non-cooperation or conflict 
described by Giordano, et al. (2005): (1) resource ownership is ill-defined or non-existent (unclear 
maritime border and undefined status of the Sea), (2) existing institutional regimes are destroyed by 
political change (Soviet-Iranian treaties could not be enforced), and (3) rapid changes in environments 
outpace the capacity of existing institutions to deal with the issue (development of oil deposits required 
settlement of property rights).
Despite many years of trying, claimant states in the South Caspian Sea have yet to agree on the delimitation 
line in the Caspian Sea. We hypothesize that several factors could explain this failure to cooperate. It started 
with the breakdown of formal institutional arrangements in the Caspian Sea as a result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Iran opposed changes in rules that would affect its strategic and economic interests in the 
Caspian. The country claims oilfields in the South Caspian such as the Alov/Alborz. As an aspiring regional 
power, and a rival to Turkey, Iran harbors strategic and security interests in the Caspian.
Because of these core interests, Iran insisted that until the gridlock is resolved the Soviet-Iranian Treaty 
should be the basis for deciding the ownership of the Sea. Tehran also stood against the classification of the 
Caspian as a sea because it possesses only about 13% of the shoreline, which would leave it with the smallest 
part of the territorial waters.
While the economic and security interests pushed North Caspian states towards cooperation, the same 
cannot be said about the South Caspian states. Iran and Turkmenistan were generally known to be hostile 
towards foreign direct investment and attracting investment was not on top of their agenda. Sanctions 
against Iran prevented the neighboring countries to trade and engage in joint investment projects. For 
example, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan explored the option of constructing a transit pipeline via Iran 
to the Persian Gulf but failed to secure investments from oil multinationals and international financial 
organizations (Orazgaliyev, 2018).
The next equally important and related factor is geopolitics. Iran was alienated in the international arena 
and became an isolated player in the region. When the conflict between Azerbaijan and Iran escalated, 
the U.S. and Turkey got involved in the Caspian issue because of their distrust over Iran. Turkey and Iran 
as neighbors were also competing as regional powers. Azerbaijan had become a de facto a proxy in the 
Iran-Turkey/US/NATO conflict. Moreover, Turkmenistan had other border issues with Iran that complicated 
discussions over the Caspian. All of this suggests that geopolitics in the South Caspian prevented claimant 
countries from arriving at a cooperative solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Another South Caspian state Turkmenistan upholds the ‘positive neutrality’ position in its foreign policy, 
according to which the country does not participate in any regional or global security organizations. The 
policy, which is entrenched in the country’s constitution, articulated that Turkmenistan not only will 
not participate in any conflicts but also will not support any of the conflicting parties in the regional or 
international arena.
Nevertheless, Turkmenistan had several disputes with Iran over gas supplies, as media reported that 
Ashgabat suspended gas delivery to Iran in the winter of 2007-2008. Similarly, gas trade cooperation 
between Moscow and Ashkhabad have worsened over time, and Turkmenistan’s gas supplies to its northern 
neighbor decreased from about 45 bcm in 2008 to just 4 bcm in 2015. This is explained by Turkmenistan’s 
increasing gas cooperation with Beijing as more than half of the Turkmen gas exports was delivered to China 
by 2012 (Stegen & Kusznir, 2015).
At the beginning of the 1990-s Azerbaijan sought to break ties with Russia and allied closely with the U.S. 
and Turkey. The country distanced itself from Russia because the latter supported Armenia in the conflict 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, Azerbaijan welcomed oil majors because multinationals had 
the technology and capital to invest in offshore oil and gas fields. In doing so, Azerbaijan aimed to secure 
Western support in its continuous confrontation with Armenia. However, after failing to find such support, 
Azerbaijan restored its diplomatic and trade relationships with Russia eventually cooperating in resolving 
control over oil resources in the Caspian.
Despite geographic proximity, the South Caspian states not only lacked established trade links but also 
failed to build ones after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Besides issues of international law and geopolitics, 
it did not help that historical and political ties in the South Caspian were weak unlike those in the North. 
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Likewise, personal chemistry and fraternal ties among leaders in the South Caspian were not as strong as 
those in the North whose leaders would frequently meet face to face to sort out difficult issues. International 
and regional geopolitics turned Iran into an isolated state which has led to a deep distrust among South 
Caspian states. In short, politics continued to trump economics the South while in the North, pragmatic 
economics trumped politics.
3.3. Recent developments on the Caspian dispute
After we submitted this paper for initial review, the leaders of Caspian riparian states met at the fifth 
Caspian summit in Aktau, Kazakhstan on August 12, 2018. The summit resulted in the signing of the 
Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The Convention stipulated that each state shall have 
its national sector of the seabed, while the surface of the sea should be treated as international waters.1 
Although the convention is regarded as a breakthrough in resolving the dispute that lasted for more than 
a quarter of a century, the countries still must agree on a bilateral basis on maritime borders.
The same way as the conflicting interests prevented the Caspian states from reaching the agreement 
for many years, the convergence of geopolitical interests pushed the countries towards more cooperative 
behavior. The consensus on the legal status of the Caspian Sea was reached mainly due to the two exogenous 
geopolitical factors. First, the introduction of Western sanctions against Russia and Iran led to the 
convergence in positions of these two countries on many issues, including the Caspian dispute. Secondly, 
the increasing participation of China in Central Asia and the Caspian region prompted Russia and Iran to 
re-establish regional cooperation to counterbalance China’s influence. It is further expected that China’s 
Belt and Road initiative (BRI) and the fruitful cooperation between the Caspian states will foster closer 
economic integration in central Eurasia.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, our paper offers two contributions to the literature on global commons. First, we highlight 
the importance of realpolitiks in the governance of the global commons – the reality that countries first 
and foremost pursue their economic and geopolitical (security) interests over other considerations. In the 
case of the North Caspian, economic and geopolitical considerations were the main drivers of cooperation. 
In the case of the South Caspian Sea, geopolitical factors hampered cooperation. Perhaps to a lesser extent, 
cultural distance (historical ties along with interpersonal relations between leaders of states) seem to have 
made the difference between the North and South Caspian.
Second, our paper also adds to Young’s (2011) regime theory i.e., governance regimes for the global 
commons are not static and can change over time as a result of interplay of economic and geopolitical 
factors. The high demand for energy driven by the rise of China and the geopolitics involving Iran, Turkey, 
the US, and Russia were two of the dynamics at play in the Caspian Sea.
We concede that our Caspian case study may not provide universal implications for generalizing to other 
global commons. In fact, it is a special case because economics and politics of oil and gas resources and 
pipelines are certainly different from other global commons such as biodiversity, artic whaling, climate, 
oceans, and international rivers. However, framing the study of global commons from the perspective of 
international relations theory – in particular, realpolitik – can help to shed light on conflict and cooperation 
in the global commons.
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